Non-super-neutralities: an open invitation (to Austrians especially)

There is nothing new in the substance of this post; it is an exposition of standard monetary theory. (Though some might find the exposition interesting.)

It is an open invitation for people to tell me where standard monetary theory of the effects of inflation might be wrong.

It's an invitation open to all, but I do have Austrian economists especially in mind. As far as I can tell, one of the main points of disagreement between Austrians and other monetary theorists concerns non-super-neutralities of money. Both believe money is not super-neutral, but Austrians seem to argue for an additional non-super-neutrality that is not present in non-Austrian monetary theory.

This matters, because I interpret Austrians to argue that the seeds of recessions like the current one are sown by monetary inflation.

First some terminology. A "nominal" variable is usually defined as one which has $ in the units; a "real" variable is one measured in physical (or non-monetary) units. (This doesn't work exactly, because both nominal and real interest rates have the units 1/time, but I am going to ignore this flaw in the definitions.)

Money is "neutral" if a change in the level of the stock of money has no effect on real variables (it only affects nominal variables).

Money is "super-neutral" if a change in the growth rate of the stock of money has no effect on real variables (it only affects the growth rate of nominal variables).

[Note to Post-Keynesians: I have defined neutrality and super-neutrality implicitly assuming "money" is exogenous; but it would be easy for me to redefine them taking any nominal variable as the exogenous control instrument or target. Indeed, my thought-experiment below makes no distinction at all between endogenous and exogenous variables.]

Standard theory says that both neutrality and super-neutrality are false in the short run. The main reason is that prices do not adjust instantly.

Standard theory says that neutrality is true in the long run (with careful caveats), where prices are assumed perfectly flexible in the long run.

Standard theory recognises that super-neutrality is not precisely true in the long run. There are some non-trivial real effects of an increase in the growth rate of the money supply. Inflation does matter in the long run.

Let us see what those real effects might be. But first, let me explain my approach.

There are two ways to solve simultaneous equations. The first way is the way (or ways) they taught you in school. The second way is to guess the answer, then check to see if your guess is correct. I'm going to use that second way. This is often how economists solve for an equilibrium. They guess what the equilibrium might look like, then check to see if their guess makes sense.

My initial guess is that money is super-neutral.

There are two economies, A and B, running side-by-side in parallel universes. At any point in time, the real variables are exactly the same in A and B. They have the same real resources, technology, population, preferences, produce the same quantities of all goods, and have the same employment, relative prices, real incomes, real savings and investment, real growth rates, etc. But B has higher inflation than A. Let's say inflation is 10% (10 percentage points) higher in B than in A. And the money supply (defined in all possible ways) is also growing 10% faster in B than in A. And it's not just average inflation that is 10% higher in B than in A; each individual price (or wage) is also growing 10% faster in B than in A. And nominal interest rates are also 10% higher in B than in A. But real interest rates (nominal interest rates minus inflation, however defined) are the same in A and B.

That's my initial guess. If it were true, money would be super-neutral. We wouldn't care about inflation, since we only care about real things.

Now, my initial guess is wrong. Here are the standard reasons why we know it's wrong (the non-super-neutralities of money):

1. If we assume that currency pays no interest, then the real interest rate on currency must be 10% lower in B than in A. This is the inflation tax on money (or currency). If we assume that the demand for money is a (negative) function of the real rate of return on money, then the real demand for money must be lower in B than in A, so in equilibrium the real stock of money M/P must be lower in B than in A.

2. If the money supply is growing 10% faster in B than in A, the central bank must be printing more money in B than in A, and will be earning higher real profits from seigniorage. (I'm assuming we are still on the right side of the Laffer curve for the inflation tax, so that the smaller M/P effect does not offset the bigger Mdot/M effect). And the higher profits will add to government revenue. This means government expenditure can be higher, or other taxes lower. To get a rough estimate of the size of this seigniorage, assume currency is 5% of GDP (in the ballpark for Canada), so a 10% higher money growth rate would create at most (ignoring the downward slope of the money demand curve) extra seigniorage of 0.5% of GDP. (And the Bank of Canada would see its annual profit fall from the current $2 billion to about $0.5 billion if it cut the inflation target from 2% to 0%.)

3. If nominal interest rates cannot go negative, and the same shock hit economies A and B, that shock might cause some nominal interest rates to hit the 0% lower bound in A but would leave them above the 0% lower bound in B. (Remember that nominal interest rates in B are guessed to be 10% higher than in A).

4. If nominal prices (and wages) are short run sticky, then nominal prices must either change more frequently in B than in A, or else change by bigger amounts when they do change. This may cause bigger costs of changing prices (menu costs) and/or bigger (inefficient) fluctuations in relative prices in B than in A. (The same applies to adjusting tax rates, minimum wages, etc..)

5. People may just get confused by a changing value of money as a device to measure values of goods, and never adjust to inflation. At the very least, when deciding whether this is a good price for eggs they will need to remember when exactly it was they last saw eggs at $2 a dozen.

6. I've probably forgotten some non-super-neutralities.

So, tell me where this list is incomplete, or wrong.

One at a time please!

56 comments

  1. Jon's avatar

    One reason why these “Austrian skeptics” are skeptical is that
    when you think about policy as above–money growth rule or price level targetting, then any malivestment from the termporary impact on the allocation of resources is due to entrepreneural error. Making investmnets based upon a termporary pattern of expenditure that only are profitable if it is permanent, would be a mistake.

    I think this is one of the most often cited misunderstandings of the Austrian argument. There is no reason to believe that these allocations will prove unprofitable! ‘Q’ can decline regardless. What has been said, however, is that there is a distribution of profitability–a range of profitable speculation which will be more or less successful depending on how well future government action is ‘guessed’. Given that there is no ‘law of small numbers’ ever twist and turn of policy will not be meet equally well.

  2. Philippe David's avatar

    Nick Rowe:
    I’m not an expert by any means but I do have some knowledge of ABCT. As I understand it the boom-bust cycle isn’t caused by inflation per se, but by the manipulation of the interest rates by central banks. As austrian theory of capital would have it, interest rates play a coordination role in a market economy the same as prices.Particularly a time coordination role. If left alone, the interest rates can perform that function very well, but if tampered with, it’ll cause discoordination in capital investment the same way that price fixing causes disruptions in supply and demand.
    It is possible for central bank to inflate without triggering a boom-bust cycle, but if a central bank sets interest rates below natural market level, as when Alan Greenspan set the rate to 1% and maintained it there for a year, il will create an unsustainable boom. Unsustainable because the interest rates do not reflect the true state of real savings.
    On the philosophical side, austrians also object to targeting inflation because of the currency debasement that discourages savings and over-stimulates credit consumption. They consider such policies are what got us into this mess.

  3. Nick Rowe's avatar

    Philippe: But if the standard theory of super-neutralities is correct, a higher long run target rate of inflation should have no effect on the real rate of interest, and so no effect on savings and investment.

  4. Philippe David's avatar

    Nick:
    If I understand you correctly, you are saying that if the cental bank just maintains inflation targeting, then there shouldn’t be any effect on real interest rates in the long run. I’m not sure if my level of knowledge can provide you with an answer to that, but from my observation of the behavior of Fed chairmen of late, we are far from a stable monetary policy on the US side. That explains why they’re in a severe recession, whereas we are having a relatively mild one.
    ABCT doesn’t really say any dose of inflation will trigger a boom-bust cycle, it contends that those cycles are caused by maintaining nominal interest rates below market level for too long. Therefore it stands to reason that there can be mild inflation without triggering a boom-bust.
    My objection would be how does even mild inflation make us better off? Printing money will always debase the currency unless there is extra production to back it up, so how does reducing its purchasing power benefits the population at large? (I do know it benefits government and certain parties close to power though)

  5. Nick Rowe's avatar

    Philippe: my main argument in favour of (say) 2% inflation target vs a (say) 0% inflation target is that nominal interest rates will, on average, be 2% higher with a 2% target than a 0% target. And since nominal interest rates need to fluctuate around that average, there is always a danger that nominal interest rates will need to go negative, but they cannot. That danger is lessened with a 2% inflation target.

  6. Philippe David's avatar

    Nick:
    I this I see what you’re driving at…
    Then I would say that the austrian argument would be that there is no need of any inflation target at all. If there is no inflation of the money supply, there would be no price inflation. Without that, interest rates would just revert to being what they’re supposed to be: a price. The price of time preference. The cost of purchasing now vs saving and purchasing later. If interest rates were left to the powers of the market, there is no way that they could go negative, real or nominal. There would even be a natural tendency for price deflation, which would make real wages grow from year to year even if nominal wages stay fixed (Imagine never having to ask the boss for a raise)and real interest rates would always be above nominal. One might even be able to argue that money could be just as super-neutral keeping a mild deflation target as keep a mild inflation target. Wouldn’t you think?

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