I am going to start with an orthodox monetarist approach, make one trivial semantic change, and see how far I can get in deriving Neo–Chartalist results. The semantic change is to change what I mean by "fiscal policy". It's an unconventional definition of fiscal policy, from a monetarist perspective, but I don't think a monetarist could otherwise object.
Let's start with the short run government budget constraint.
G-T +iB = dB + dM
Where G is government spending, T is taxes, i the interest rate on B, the existing stock of government bonds, dB the change in B, and dM the change in the stock of central bank money.
Fiscal deficits must be financed by issuing bonds, or money, or some combination of the two.
One conventional definition of "fiscal policy" is a change in G or T holding M constant (bond-financed deficits). A change in M counts as "monetary policy". Suppose instead we define "fiscal policy" as a change in G or T holding B constant (money-financed deficits). A change in B is what now counts as "monetary policy".
What the new dictionary calls "fiscal policy" the old dictionary considers as fiscal policy supplemented by monetary policy. And what the old dictionary calls "fiscal policy" the new dictionary considers to be fiscal policy with a countervailing monetary policy.
How would monetarism change if monetarists were forced to translate their beliefs into the language of the new dictionary?
Fiscal policy would have a very powerful effect on aggregate demand. (Sure, because it means increasing the money supply.)
Fiscal policy is unconstrained by the government's ability to borrow. (Of course it isn't, if it's financed by printing money rather than by borrowing.)
Providing it is not pushed too far and creates inflation, fiscal deficits impose no burden on future generations of tax-payers. (Sure, because deficits are financed by printing money rather than borrowing, so there's no future debt to pay; but watch out for the inflation tax if you do push it too far.)
By accepting goods (including labour) in lieu of taxes, at some fixed equivalence, fiscal policy can determine the price level. (Sure, because "taxes" mean a reduction in the money supply. It's just like the gold standard, where you can peg the price of gold by exchanging gold for money at a fixed rate, only it doesn't have to be gold of course.)
In general, once he realised that Neo-Chartalism uses "fiscal policy" to mean "money-financed fiscal policy", I don't see how a monetarist would really object to Neo-Chartalist policy recommendations. If we found ourselves well below "full-employment" (you mean below the natural rate), where there was no risk of inflation, the Neo-Chartalist's "fiscal deficits" (you mean helicopter money) would be supported by both.
Now, there are some Neo-Chartalist beliefs that may indeed be substantively different from (say) Monetarist beliefs. For example: those concerning the role of the state in determining what people use as money; and how paper money can have value. Those would need another post. But as for fiscal and monetary policy, Neo-Chartalism looks to me a lot like Monetarism plus a new dictionary. (OK, maybe add a Paleo-Keynesian reverse-L-shaped Aggregate Supply curve too.)
It would be equally possible, of course, to argue that Monetarists are really Neo-Chartalists plus an old dictionary.
I expect a Neo-Chartalist might object that fiscal policy really is money-financed, and this is not just some semantic question. And I wrote my post on Churches and Central Banks partly in anticipation of such a response. But suppose the currency printing press really really is located in the Treasury rather than in the central bank. That might matter in a game-theoretic analysis of the interaction between central bank and Treasury, if the two players have different objectives. But otherwise, so what? Why does it matter?
And where is the printing press located that prints bonds? Isn't that located in the Treasury too? Because if both are located in Treasury, how can the central bank do anything? It can't print money to buy bonds, and it can't print bonds to buy money.
Or perhaps both Treasury and central bank have a currency printing press? If so, should we not be looking at the game of chicken if the two players have different objectives? Because if they share the same objective, one press is redundant.
(I admit I'm new to Neo-Chartalism, and am almost certainly misunderstanding some of it. Several decades ago I did try to read Knapp's State Theory of Money, finding it not worth the candle, and actually did read and enjoyed reading Lerner's Functional Finance. This critique is part of my attempt to understand it better.)
Worthwhile Canadian Initiative 
The paper by Randall Wray referred to by Scott above is excellent, which in Wray’s case is standard issue.
A couple of extracts:
“Just as the ‘external’ world does not care about the accounting maneuvers practiced by husband and wife within the household, the internal accounting machinations between the Fed and the U.S. Treasury are not important for our analysis. Many economists find all this so very confusing because they do not understand the nature of the internal accounting procedures followed by the Fed and Treasury… procedures that they have imposed on themselves and which are not dictated by logical necessity.
…
In any case, in all modern economies, there is a division of responsibilities such that the central bank is responsible for draining/adding reserves on a day-to-day basis (often referred to as offsetting operating factors), while the treasury is responsible for draining/adding reserves over a longer run. It does this by selling/retiring sovereign debt. Whenever it runs a sustained deficit, it will be adding reserves to the system, which will likely generate excess reserve positions. Sales of new sovereign debt then drain the excess reserves (in the USA complicated procedures are followed, often involving specially designated private banks, but this changes nothing of substance… see Bell 2000).”
I see no reference at all to central bank “seigniorage” earnings. This is not surprising, as that particular measurement is a deconsolidated, artificial construct from a Chartalist point of view. It just gets in the way of understanding what’s really going on.
Dear Nick. I’ve copied your previous post here and supplied a Chartalist response. Again, a big thank you for providing the opportunity to discuss this with you and others. My comments are in CAPS below. Best, Scott
Well, I’ve read through the comments. Not sure with some whether I disagree with them or just don’t understand them. Rather than try to address them point by point, I’m going to summarise what I now believe:
The govt/CB has a de facto monopoly on issuing certain types of money (especially currency), and this enables it to earn monopoly profits. We can think of those monopoly profits as “seigniorage”.
THE GOVT IS THE BY ACCOUNTING DEFINITION THE MONOPOLY SUPPLIER OF NET FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR THE NON-GOVT SECTOR. THESE NET FINANCIAL ASSETS ARE EQUAL TO THE SUM OF CURRENCY, RESERVE BALANCES, AND TREASURIES LESS CENTRAL BANK LOANS.
UNDER A NON-GOLD STANDARD-TYPE OF MONETARY SYSTEM, THERE IS NO OPERATIONAL, FINANCIAL, OR NOMINAL LIMIT TO THE GOVT’S ABILITY TO DO THIS. THERE ARE USUALLY POLITICAL LIMITS THAT ARE SELF-IMPOSED. AND THERE IS A “REAL” LIMIT IN THE SENSE OF ECONOMIC CAPACITY.
AS SUCH, SEIGNIORAGE “PROFITS” ARE ECONOMICALLY UNIMPORTANT IN THAT THEY DO NOT ENABLE MORE SPENDING AND LESS OF THEM DOES NOT CONSTRAIN SPENDING. INSTEAD, SEIGNIORAGE IS SIMPLY THE ACCOUNTING RECORD OF REDUCED INTEREST ON THE NATIONAL DEBT AS CURRENCY IN CIRCULATION OR RESERVE BALANCES RISE RELATIVE TO INTEREST-BEARING TREASURIES HELD BY THE NON-GOVT SECTOR.
A counterfeiter who can print currency undetected steals some of those monopoly profits. If he prints a real quantity dM/P annually, he can use it to buy more goods (increase G), work less (reduce T), or pay off his debt, and reduce his interest payments (reduce B/P and hence iB/P).
IF SOMEONE IS ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY COUNTERFEIT GOVERNMENT CURRENCY AND SPEND, THEN IT IS ESSENTIALLY THE ECONOMIC EQUIVALENT OF A GREATER QTY OF NET FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR THE NON-GOVT SECTOR. AS SUCH, THE FED GOVT’S DEFICIT SHOULD BE SET AT A SMALLER QTY TO AVOID REACHING REAL CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS IN THE ECONOMY. THIS REDUCED “SEIGNIORAGE PROFIT” IS ESSENTIALLY A REDUCED NATIONAL DEBT.
HOWEVER, JUST BECAUSE AN INDIVIDUAL COUNTERFEITS SUCCESSFULLY DOESN’T OPERATIONALLY REQUIRE THE GOVT TO REDUCE THE DEFICIT AS AN OFFSET AND THUS DOESN’T NECESSARIL REDUCE “SEIGNIORAGE.” HOWEVER, THIS WOULD, CETERIS PARIBUS, RAISE NOMINAL INCOME AND POSSIBLY RAISE PRICES (DEPENDING UPON THE RESPONSE OF PRICES TO THE ADDED SPENDING).
We can either consolidate or not consolidate the govt and CB budget constraints. Let’s consider both in turn.
If we think the CB has a different objective from the govt, and doesn’t always do what the govt wants it to do, then it may make sense to separate the budget constraints. In this case, it matters whether it is the govt or the CB that has the power to issue currency (or whatever the money is over which it has de facto monopoly power).
THIS IS MOSTLY UNRELATED TO THE POINTS WE ARE MAKING.
If the CB has the power to issue currency, and the govt has the power to issue bonds, I can make sense of the world.
THE TREASURY’S ACCOUNT IS A LIABILITY ON THE CB’S BALANCE SHEET. OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS CREATE RESERVE BALANCES, BY ACCOUNTING IDENTITY. GOVT SPENDING CREATES RESERVE BALANCES, BY ACCOUNTING IDENTITY. BOTH CAN ISSUE LIABILITIES . . . THE TSY CALLS THESE TREASURIES, THE CB USUALLY CALLS THESE REVERSE REPOS. THE CB PROVIDES CURRENCY TO THE NON-GOVT SECTOR AT THE REQUEST OF THE LATTER, WHICH BANKS PURCHASE VIA A DEBIT TO THEIR RESERVE ACCOUNTS AT THE CB.
The Bank of Canada now has the wherewithal to purchase bonds (which explains how it owns bonds), and has the power to earn monopoly profits which it can remit to the govt annually.
YES.
If you tell me that it is the govt and not the CB that issues currency, I can make no sense of the world.
SEE MY COMMENT ABOVE . . . THE CB PUTS CURRENCY INTO CIRCULATION WHEN BANKS PURCHASE IT VIA DEBITS TO THEIR RESERVE ACCOUNTS.
How did the Bank of Canada get the wherewithal to buy all the bonds it owns?
IT CREDITS RESERVE ACCOUNTS TO BUY BONDS.
How can the Bank of Canada with a tiny net worth earn the $2B profits it remits to the govt annually?
INTEREST INCOME ON LOANS AND SECURITIES, CAPITAL GAINS ON SECURITIES, AND SETTLEMENT SERVICES.
Alternatively we can consolidate the CB and govt budget constraints. In which case it is irrelevant which one issues the currency, because they are both the same entity.
IT’S RELEVANT IN THE SENSE OF GETTING THE ACCOUNTING RIGHT. AGAIN, I’M NOT SURE WHY THIS BECAME SUCH AN ISSUE, AS WE’VE SAID ALMOST NOTHING ABOUT “CURRENCY.” ALMOST ALL THE POINTS WE’VE MADE ARE ABOUT RESERVE BALANCES, TREASURIES, AND NET FINANCIAL ASSETS. CURRENCY IS RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT AND, AGAIN, SUPPLIED AT THE REQUEST OF THE NON-GOVT SECTOR VIA DEBITS TO RESERVE ACCOUNTS.
Working with a consolidated balance sheet from now on:
As Adam P says, the govt has no binding nominal constraint.
AGREE.
As Adam P says, the govt does have a binding real (i.e. price-level-adjusted) constraint, BUT:
AGREE
i) seigniorage gives it an additional source of revenue that is not available to normal people.
WHY DOES THE ENTITY THAT SPENDS BY CREATING CREDITS TO RESERVE ACCOUNTS AND DEPOSITS NEED AN ADDITIONAL SOURCE OF REVENUE? IT MAKES MUCH MORE SENSE TO CONSIDER SEIGNIORAGE A REDUCTION IN THE DEFICIT AS ABOVE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THAT’S WHAT’S ACTUALLY HAPPENING ON THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
ii) AND (this is where I line up at least in parallel with the Neo-Chartalists, if not side-by-side), if inflation is not a danger, and until you hit the point where inflation is a danger, seigniorage is UNLIMITED.
ABILITY TO CREATE NET FINANCIAL ASSETS IS “ALWAYS” UNLIMITED. THERE IS A REAL CONSTRAINT, THOUGH, BEYOND WHICH INFLATION RISES.
Or, to say the same thing another way, inflation eventually getting “too high” if you push it “too far” is the ONLY thing that limits seigniorage. Just to be precise, “too high” can be interpreted politically (as in Canada’s decision to target 2% inflation), or ultimately it can be interpreted as the top of the seigniorage Laffer Curve, the point where the demand for currency is unit-elastic. And “too far” means “past the natural rate” (which translates roughly as “full employment” in the monetarist-Neo-Chartalist dictionary).
And if any critic of the Monetarist/Neo-Chartalist position on this point says “But won’t printing money cause inflation?” our proper response should be: “It certainly will cause a higher rate of inflation than would happen otherwise (at least we hope it will), and we want that to happen, because what would happen otherwise would be deflation (or inflation less than 2%)!”
AS I’VE NOTED MANY TIMES IN THIS THREAD ALREADY, A KEY POINT IS THAT A DEFICIT “FINANCED” BY BOND SALES IS NOT LESS INFLATIONARY THAN ONE UNACCOMPANIED BY BOND SALES. IN FACT, THE BOND SALES ARE MORE INFLATIONARY GIVEN THE ADDITIONAL INTEREST PAYMENT TO THE NON-GOVT SECTOR.
If inflation is not a danger, and until inflation is a danger, a government that finances its deficits by issuing bonds is doing something stupid, sort of like imposing a financing limit on itself where none need exist. (I think Neo-Chartalists are saying the same thing.)
NO. BOND SALES OR SOME OTHER METHOD OF PROVIDING INTEREST EARNING ACCOUNTS TO THE NON-GOVT SECTOR IS OPERATIONALLY NECESSARY IF A POSITIVE INTEREST RATE TARGET IS DESIRED. BUT, YET AGAIN, THIS IS NOT LESS INFLATIONARY.
But why do Neo-Chartalists stop there?
WE DON’T. WE’RE STILL JUST SCRATCHING THE SURFACE, ONLY DEALING TO THIS POINT WITH SOME BASIC ACCOUNTING BETWEEN THE TREASURY AND CB.
You aren’t radical enough, you timorous bunch! (Or maybe I’ve misunderstood you.)
SEE WARREN MOSLER’S PROPOSALS IN THE LINK POSTED BY JKH.
If inflation is not a danger, don’t just print enough money to pay the current deficit; print a whole lot more to buy back some bonds, so you won’t have to pay the interest on those bonds in future, which means you will be able to increase G and/or reduce T in future years.
OK, BUT “PRINTING MONEY” TO BUY BACK BONDS REDUCES THE DEFICIT BY THE SIZE OF THE COUPON PMTS THAT ARE RETIRED. AGAIN, THIS REDUCES INFLATIONARY IMPACT.
And keep on doing this till you get to the point where doing any more would make inflation a danger.
COMPLETELY AGREE.
Scott: and I thank you and the other commenters for engaging me. I only wish my brain was better able to understand it all better.
JKH: I confess my tongue was in cheek on the “timorous” bit 😉
“Therefore, the central bank may have some indirect influence on the demand for currency in the long run, but I would be careful about this.”
But the demand for currency does depends on: real income; the price level; the nominal rate of interest (which in the long run varies one for one with the inflation rate). In the very short run the central bank can influence real and nominal interest rates; in the short run it can influence real income; and in the long run it can influence the price level and rate of inflation. Post Keynesians (and Neo-Wicksellians) go one way around the causal chain; while traditional monetarists go the other way round the causal chain, but they end up in exactly the same place. There are certain equilibrium relationships between quantity of currency, price level, real income, real and nominal interest rates, and inflation, that must be obeyed, regardless of the direction of causality. I’m afraid I’ve become rather a relativist/post-modernist about the direction of causality. It’s hard to take a realist view of causal direction when you see the world as the solution to a set of simultaneous equations.
On seigniorage, if we simplify and assume govt/CB money pays no interest, and has no running costs, and all govt bonds pay the same interest, all our views end up the same. If $100 new money is issued permanently, that means $100 less bonds are needed, and if bonds pay 5% interest, that’s a saving of $5 interest per year permanently, the present value of which, at 5%, is $100. In more complicated cases we have to do a JKH-style calculation.
Now, I must gather my brains together, to try sometime to tackle the other part of Chartalism: the bit about the state determining what counts as money via its choice of what to accept in taxes.
Rebel: Yes, In Canada the Bank of Canada gets the seigniorage from notes (and eventually gives it to the government), but the government gets it directly from the Mint (from coins). This caused a minor kerfuffle when the $1 coin (the Loonie) replaced the $1 note.
Re: seigniorage . . . ok,
The points I’m making, that I haven’t seen addressed one way or the other (acknowledged, or whatever, not that I’m trying to be a 3 year old clamoring for attention . . . and I have one of those, so I know how annoying that can be) are the folliwing:
1. Seigniorage income doesn’t provide any financial ability for the govt to spend more. However, as Nick noted, less interest due in the future will enable larger primary deficits in the future than otherwise would be the case, ceteris paribus, before reaching capacity constraints.
2. For a given primary deficit (Govt spending less tax revenue), more seigniorage simply means a smaller total deficit (govt spending + interest payments on the debt less tax revenue).
Scott: I understand what you are saying about seigniorage reducing the total deficit for any given primary deficit (and I agree), but I don’t understand what your point is. Are you asking “So what?”?
Taking a stab in the dark: Any government that wants higher real spending and lower real taxes, and doesn’t want to default on its bonds faces a long run budget constraint. If that government could not issue money (like a Canadian provincial government, for example), its long run budget constraint would be that the existing stock of bonds equal the present value of primary surpluses. For a government that can issue non-interest-bearing money, the long run budget constraint becomes the existing stock of bonds equals the present value of primary surpluses PLUS the present value of seigniorage. That relaxes the long run budget constraint.
I’ve probably missed your point.
Let me restate: the long run budget constraint becomes:
the real value of existing stock of bonds held by the non-government/CB sector equals the present value of surpluses plus the present value of the stream of FUTURE increases in the money supplies/Price level.
In other words, past money creation means the existing stock of bonds is smaller, which means the present value of primary surpluses can be smaller, but FUTURE money creation ALSO allows smaller present value of primary surpluses.
I think maybe that was what you might have been looking for.
Hi Nick
I think you’ve got it, roughly, at least from within the neoclassical language for explaining this stuff. Note that “relaxes the long run budget constraint” is the equivalent of “less inflationary.” So, while it’s normally thought that “printing money” is more inflationary, your own statement above suggests otherwise.
Best,
Scott
Nick and all,
Thanks for the great discussion. It’s very generous of you to share your time and knowledge.
I’m not an economist and recently stumbled on Neo_Chartalism in a chance reading a comment by Ramanan, Being an Econ 101 kind of guy, I thought it sounded far-fetched, but I thought also that if it were true….. So I checked it out and quickly became a convert after I “saw the light.” Since then, I’ve been eating it up and recommending it widely, only because it shatters shiboleths like “fiscal responsibility” and “taxpayer-funded,” but also because adopting its principles promises to lead to improved policy, in particular, full employment with price stability.
Understanding Modern Money by L. Randall Wray (1998) is the most accessible introduction to the development, principles and implications of modern monetary theory that I have found. Understanding Modern Money is a popularization geared to the level of people with a basic understanding of economics, so a professional economist could breeze through it quickly, but just about any educated reader should be able to get it with some digging. (No graphs, no math). It’s even available to read on Google Books.
http://books.google.com/books?id=6PMuExCtMe8C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=&f=false
Abba Lerner’s short paper, “Functional Finance and the Federal Debt,” lays out and elaborates on the two principles of functional finance upon which Neo-Chartalism builds.
Click to access functional%20finance.pdf
So if this discussion seemed over anyone’s head, there is hope for everyone to be able to get it.
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My post said: “With my definition of money and with legal tender laws, I consider currency, currency denominated gov’t debt, and currency denominated private debt to be money (that is they are all mostly fungible).”
Nick’s post said: “Too much Fed: If you think M and B are equivalent, then there is only fiscal policy, defined as any change in G and/or T regardless of what happens to the composition of M+B.”
I consider currency, currency denominated gov’t debt, and currency denominated private debt to be money (that is they are all mostly fungible) because they can be used to purchase goods/services and/or financial assets in the present. However, they have different terms in regards to whether an interest rate is attached, who gets the interest payment, who owes the interest payment, what repayment terms are attached, what (if any) collateral is attached, and whether time differences can be created (like can excess savers and excess debtors exist).
G-T +iB = dB + dM
Let’s balance the budget, have no bonds (no interest payments), and have no change in the bonds.
Does that mean dM (the change in the stock of “central bank money”) is zero?
If so, I’m even more in favor of a balanced budget amendment with no currency denominated gov’t debt allowed.
Any chance that gov’t debt is the maximum amount of “central bank money”?
Once again I think I need a definition of central bank money. Currency? Bank reserves? Currency plus bank reserves?
Nick,
I don’t care what you call it, it is what I think is the correct policy in a liquidity trap. And I think you could even get the Keynesians to agree on it. So why aren’t we doing it?
Tom,
Thanks for noticing my comment. Where did you notice it ? Convert ? Hmm .. I thought Chartalism is close to Atheism! – Galileo fighting against the church and dropping two masses from the leaning tower of Pisa. Unfortunately in Economics we cannot do “experiments” in isolation.
Nick,
There have been a lot of discussions on “funding” the deficit with bonds and printing. James Tobin said the same in Money and finance in the macroeconomic process – his Nobel lecture and went into the direction of Monetarism. It is a possibility but doesnt happen like that in reality as JKH and Scott say somewhere. Inflationary or not is another debate but the fact is that currency is printed on demand not decided by the Treasury/CB.
In fact, the present crisis happened because the deficits were too low in the recent past. Remember Clinton’s surpluses followed by a temporary recession ? I am not an Economist by degree or profession but have searched for literature and found that people moving around the Levy Institute gave sufficient warning about a crisis – recession and huge unemployment rates – arguments logically tight, and unlike Schiffs and Roubinis.
Good comments by all.
NICK: I don’t have anything further to add, JKH and Scott have gone through the accounting and operational details of Chartilism.
“If inflation is not a danger, don’t just print enough money to pay the current deficit; print a whole lot more to buy back some bonds, so you won’t have to pay the interest on those bonds in future.” It’s easier than this, since the Govt creates the reserves first, and then issues the bonds to shuffle already extant assets. The Govt would simple cease issuing Treasuries, just stop, and as outstanding Treasuries mature, it would reverse the operation that created them in the first place and re-credit reserve accounts. The Govt does not need to print money to buy back bonds and more than you need to earn more wages to move money from your savings account back to your checking account.
Philosophically, I would suggest you ponder this statement of yours: “seigniorage gives [the Government] an additional source of revenue that is not available to normal people.” Why, in God’s name, would a currency issuer need any external sources of revenue? Understanding the massive and profound distinction between a currency issuer and a currency user helped me get my head around Chartilism. It may help you, or not. Viewing the Govt as some kind of enormous household is an error when thinking about macro-econ. It may also help you get stuck with ideas like the above.
Again, thank you for hosting this excellent discussion
winterspeak: “Why, in God’s name, would a currency issuer need any external sources of revenue?”
Bingo! This is the kicker of Neo-Charlatism. Once you get this, everything else is simple to grasp in terms of national accounting identities. A sovereign government acting as monopoly provider of a non-convertible fiat currency within a flexible rate regime is not revenue constrained. The government is not financially limited, and the government can never become insolvent or default as long as its obligations are denominated in the currency for which it is monopoly provider, which it issues “by fiat” — although there are real constraints, of course.
Government and non-government stand in the vertical relationship of issuer and user, not a horizontal one, as implied by Y=C=I+G+NX, and the popular household finances analogy. Taxpayers don’t fund either government spending or government borrowing with their tax revenues, and the government doesn’t put its surpluses into a giant vault or savings account to draw on later, as people at large fancifully imagine.
Importantly, from this vertical relationship, it follows from accounting identities that the government deficit equals the non-government surplus, and vice versa. See Bill Mitchell’s “Stock-flow consistent macro models.”
http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=4870
Bill Mitchell neatly illustrates how this works in his humorous blog post, “A simple business cared economy.”
http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=1075
As cognitive scientist George Lakoff might say, “It’s the framing, stupid.” This whole discussion has been about shifting the frame of reference so as to be able to see correctly what Neo-Chartalism is actually saying. This shift clearly has significant policy implications that gives the government much more latitude than either neoliberal orthodoxy, Austrian “sound money” allow, as well as New Keynesianism and much Post Keynesianism (Paul Davidson).
So the simple shift that winterspeak mentions is a very big deal.
I would like to see these videos reviewed.