I think we could all use a lighter topic to discuss. Here’s one, courtesy of Baseball Reference. Sean Forman lists the five most “clutch” and five least clutch players in Major League Baseball history. Frank Robinson comes in as the 2nd least clutch, which causes Sean Forman to respond:
I’m going to let someone else tell Frank Robinson about his ranking here.
I don’t think Mr. Robinson would be surprised by his ranking. Below the fold I’ll discuss why.
I will state from the outset of this – it is difficult for me to be objective about this topic, because Frank Robinson is my all-time favourite baseball player. His BR Bullpen biography is a must read. I absolutely love this part:
My favorite Robinson memory was the 10th inning of the sixth game of the 1971 World Series, where in spite of a pulled thigh muscle which he’d suffered running to third on Merv Rettenmund’s single, he scored the winning run on a sacrifice fly by Brooks that was so short that it barely seemed to loft past the infield dirt. Robinson just willed himself to home plate, and I swear the throw was wide simply because the goddamn baseball was scared to get within ten feet of Frank Robinson.
The “clutch” metric measures a player’s performance in game-changing situations. A baseball hitter will naturally perform poorer in a clutch setting – in a tie game in the 9th inning he’ll likely be facing a star closer such as Dennis Eckersley or Goose Gossage or Hoyt Wilhelm. In a 8-0 blowout in the 4th inning, you’ll be facing a washed up old journeyman or some 22-year old kid called up from AAA. Doing well in the clutch metric means that your performance in clutch situations is better than your performance in non-clutch situations. This can happen because a player:
- Performs particularly well in the clutch.
- Performs particularly poorly in non-clutch situations.
Earl Weaver’s Weaver on Strategy is not just a great baseball book – it may be the best book on microeconomics ever written (though I’ll leave that for another time). Weaver on what it takes to win baseball’s “Triple Crown”:
Eddie Murray is like Reggie Jackson in that his individual statistics might be a little better if the game were always on the line when he batted, which is the attitude needed to win the Triple Crown…
In a game that is a blowout I suppose every player may sort of give up an at bat once in a while. No one can totally concentrate for all six hundred at bats, although Frank Robinson came as close to doing so as anyone who has ever played. It seemed as though he never let up for a moment, no matter what inning or the score. Frank realized that a 9-2 lead in the seventh inning isn’t always safe.
So we shouldn’t be surprised to find that Frank Robinson performs poorly in the ‘clutch metric’.
I have never been able to determine whether or not giving a full effort in a blow-out is a good idea or a waste. The expression “save it for another day when you’ll need it” is often used in blow-outs, suggesting that there’s a trade-off between performance today and performance tomorrow (in other words, an opportunity cost). If there is, then Robinson’s giving 100% at all times is misguided. But is there really a tradeoff? I haven’t seen much in the behavioural economics literature about the issue. It’s likely because this tradeoff is impossible or nearly impossible to test and measure. I’m not even sure how you’d begin.
Worthwhile Canadian Initiative 
I’ve read a fair amount about this as it pertains to basketball. Slate has run two pieces about it in the last couple of years.
http://www.slate.com/id/2255932
http://www.slate.com/id/2217721/
I think clutch play is really about two factors: not caving under pressure, and trying extra hard at “important” times. The first factor is unambiguously good. The second is debatable.
Thanks for the links!
One thing that may be going on here – baseball closers are disproportionately power pitchers. Take Pedro Cerrano from the ‘Major League’ movies, who destroyed fastballs but was helpless against a good curveball. He’d clean up on this metric. I should check how Mark Belanger scores (he used to destroy Nolan Ryan and hit .200 against everyone else) But guys who were better against curveball type pitchers would score poorly.
Mike Schmidt is on the anti-clutch list and he used to absolutely own Bert Blyleven, so maybe there’s something to that.
The Nikkei Futures: Saturation Macroeconomic’s x/2.5x/2x Skeletal
Structure on a Day Unit Basis: Confirmation of a Patterned
Macroeconomic Science. [
Jul 24, 2010 8:13 AM
The Nikkei Futures: Saturation Macroeconomic’s Empirical x/2.5x/2x
Growth Skeletal Structure With Ideal Elegant Evolution in a Day Unit
Three Phase Fractal Series
Confirmation of a Patterned Macroeconomic Science.
The Wilshire’s 11 October 2007 nominal high was prospectively
predicted by the new science of nonstochastic saturation
macroeconomics.
Nikkei Futures: x/2.5x/2x :: 8/20/15 of 16 days with possible
extension to 2x-2.5x of the third fractal
In the main page of The Economic Fractalist
http://www.economicfractalist.com/ the Macroeconomy’s underlying Growth and
Decay fractal pattern is defined.
“The ideal growth fractal time sequence is X, 2.5X, 2X and 1.5-1.6X.
The first two cycles include a saturation transitional point and decay
process in the terminal portion of the cycles. A sudden nonlinear drop
in the last 0.5x time period of the 2.5X is the hallmark of a second
cycle and characterizes this most recognizable cycle. After the
nonlinear gap drop, the third cycle begins. This means that the second
cycle can last anywhere in length from 2x to 2.5x. The third cycle 2X
is primarily a growth cycle with a lower saturation point and decay
process followed by a higher saturation point. The last 1.5-1.6X cycle
is primarily a decay cycle interrupted with a mid area growth period.
Near ideal fractal cycles can be seen in the trading valuations of
many commodities and individual stocks. Most of the cycles are
caricatures of the ideal and conform to Gompertz mathematical type
saturation and decay curves. ”
Observe the Daily Nikkei Future’s patterns which is a trading day
behind the Euro-US equity valuation market.
8/20/15 of 16 days with a nonlinear drop between day 16 and 17 of the
second fractal – exactly defining the nature of a second fractal.
The15 day third fractal of the 8/20/15 of 15-17 day is composed of a
3/8/6 of 6-8 day x/2.5x/2-2.5x fractal with a nonlinear drop between
day 7 and 8 in the 2-2.5x time frame of the third 15 day fractal’s 8
day second subfractal (3/8/6 days) sequence.
Huh?
Or more to the point: Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam, Spam.
“Clutch” is a useless concept. Good batters are successful one time in three so all sorts of strange correlations arise.
The best clutch hitter in the National League in the last few years has been Andre Ethier – who is very good but not one of the greats. Why has he so many walk-off hits? He bats before Manny Ramirez. Walking Ethier is dreadful in a game-on-the line situation because it doesn’t get an out and it brings up one of the best hitters ever with at least one runner on base. As a result Ethier gets thrown strikes. And he is very good so he hits alot of them.
… but there us such a thing as situational hitting. With runner on third, one out and a tie game in the eighth inning, a deep fly ball caught on the warning track is great hitting.
Similarly, it was Luis Gonzalez of the D-backs against the Yankees who won a world series by choking up on the bat with a runner on third and two outs. He barely hit the ball hard enough to get it out of the infield. It scored a run. No way was he going to hit a Rivera fastball on a full swing.
,
The neat thing about baseball is that the sphere of contention is controlled by the defence, unlike hockey, football, soccer, etc., therefore clutch pitching inhibits clutch hitting. The topic is at the wrong end of the 60′-6″ dimension. All base hits are results of mistakes by the pitcher, batters and throwers know this and pitchers usually make more mistake to-wards the latter inning as they tire….and when most hits considered “clutch”, occur.