Germany promises to keep pushing for a bank tax:
Merkel to push financial reform at G20: German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Thursday called for a global levy on banks, a new European rating agency and a co-ordinated exit from stimulus measures as Germany stepped up efforts to drive financial regulatory reform…
She said Germany would push its partners to introduce taxes on banks. “Accountability is what is required in every state and I don’t think it will ruin financial markets if we could agree on an international taxation."
To put this into context, here's an interesting article dredged up by Tyler Cowen at Marginal Revolution:
German banks take aim at Basel III leverage cap: A planned cap on bank leverage would not make the sector safer, said a German banking lobby on Friday, adding heavyweight support to a growing campaign.
Tyler Cowan continues:
Might I go out on a limb and suggest that some of these European banks are…excessively leveraged? In theory the Basel III reforms will adjust the leverage restrictions for the risk of bank assets. It's been the case for a long time that many German banks have higher measured degrees of leverage. But are they more leveraged, all things considered? If they're worried about Basel III, maybe the answer is yes.
It would appear that the Europeans are more interested in finding people to pay for their bank bailouts than in preventing them from happening in the first place.
Worthwhile Canadian Initiative 
Paul Friesen,
Contingent capital would help maintain bank solvency. When the conversion kicks in, the bank’s liabilities are reduced. This allows the bank room to sell off assets (say to pay down liabilities that are due) and still maintain required capital ratios. If the bank owns another bank’s contingent capital that gets converted, it doesn’t have to result in a firesale of the newly acquired equity; the bank can sell other assets to raise the cash it needs. Also, other banks will not be the only holders of the contingent capital. In the US at least, other major investors in high yield debt include insurance companies, pension funds, endowments, hedge funds, and mutual funds. Whether proposed levels of contingent capital would have been sufficient in the 2008 crisis is another matter.
You said, “Just set up rules that ensure that managers take a big hit personally if the institution needs rescuing, and the moral hazard problem goes away.”
I don’t think this is correct. Banks operate at very high leverage. This means that the creditors have far more at risk than the owners or the managers. The managers, especially, can reap many years of large bonuses before the risk-taking causes an implosion and sinks the company. Even in the absence of a bailout of the equity holders, the managers are in a position to benefit by making big bets with other people’s money. The moral hazard problem is therefore mainly the result of bailing out creditors, which reduces creditors’ incentive to monitor and restrict the risk taking of the owners/management. http://cafehayek.com/2009/10/how-moral-hazard-works.html